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KOSOVO/A1 CONFLICT AND THE POST-COLD WAR 
ORDER: RUSSIAAND TURKEY POLICIES. 
Enika Abazi * 
!.Introduction 
Kosovo/a conflict as an event, has generated great debates related to the 
way the case was processed and implications it brought into international 
relations in general and states' Post Cold War identity issues and foreign po licy 
in particular. At the international leve] the case was defined by many scholars 
as the event that mostly related with the symbolic and sermonic omen about 
the 'shape and shove' of the Post Cold War system. The symbolic of the case 
surged out controversies related to the Weberian concept of state autonomy2 
that recognize the supreme authority of the state in the domestic realm and 
state centrality3 in international relations, assuming full respect over state 
sovereignty and integrity in the international system. In the case of Kosovo/a 
both concepts lost their sanctity. Scholars and policy makers exceedingly 
debated intervention, institutions and legitimacy as concepts and practice. The 
case, mo're then every other event in the Post Cold Era forewarned the 
configuration of new power distribution, differentiating states in weak and 
strong in Waltzian's terms (Waltz, 1979)4, while fuelling their internai security 
dilemma related to societal identity5 and other insecurities. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Eni ka Abazi Ph.D. candidate 1 Research Assistant Bilkent University, Ankara 
Kosovo is the Serbian name for the region, and as such is used in international vocabulary. Kosova is Albanian 
appellation for the region. Kosovo/a would be used thorough the text as a way of being fair to ali parties. 
The concept of state autonomy connotes "the ability of the state to make dornes tic or foreign po licy as weil 
as shape the domestic realm, free of domestic social-structural requirements or the interests of non-state actors" 
(Hobson, 2000: 5). 
The concept of state centrality define state "as a unit-force 'entity"' able "to nùtigate the 1ogic of inter-state 
competition and thereby create a cooperative or peaceful world" (Hobson, 2000:8 and 218) (whether it is 
imbued with high or low domestic agential power) 
In Waltz terms the strong states have maximized their power and have influential decision-making, which 
other-vice points out great powers; the weak states are the followers that do not have other choice but to take 
this rote. 
Societal identity imply according to Buzan ( 1991: 19) "sustainability, with acceptable conditions for evolution, 
of traditional patterns of language, culture and relig ious and national identity and custom". 
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With the end of the Cold War every major state/actor in world politics 
proved to be in the middle of a profound change. In the 10 years that followed 
this event, Kosovo/a marked an important development in the Post Cold War 
era. In Europe, it marked the end of the Cold War structures; it demonstrated 
'the primacy ofhuman rights in international politics ' (Dini, Autumn 1999: 4); 
and it redefined 'aspects of security in relation between NATO and the EU and 
NATO and Russia' (Rotfeld, 2000: 182), and the EU and Turkey. Actor's place 
and policies gained currency and momentum sometime reflecting a blurred 
vision for the future. 
In many respects Kosovo/a case remained a hostage of geopolitics, historical 
and present symbolics. At an international leve! it could be considered as a test 
of Post Cold War geo-politics proving that unfortunately nothing has changed 
from the realist world politics perceptions. In an anarchical world still the 
distribution of capabilities matter as a definer of state 's behaviour. 
This theoretical conceptual framework is large involving vast and debatable 
issues, each of them dealt specifically and extensive} y by other international 
scholars. The present paper will avoid the theoretical debate; it will only use 
theoretical framework for developing a case study. For the purpose of this 
paper the role, place and poli ci es of Russia and Turkey towards the Kosovo/a 
conflict would be reviewed briefly as case studies in the light of their shifting 
strategie landscape, security concems and domestic developments after the end 
of the Cold War era. The aim of this paper is not to detail ail Russia and Turkey 
efforts and practices in dealing with the case of Kosovo conflict, neither would 
it enumerate ali circumstances and effecting factors. These limitations are done 
with the intention of avoiding onerous details whilst preserving the cohesion 
and consistency of the paper. 
2. Russia and Turkey in the Balkans. A Short Historical Record 
Historically Russia and Turkey have been important players and in a way 
or in an other, have both been present in making the Balkans' history and 
competing with each other for supremacy, control and influence in the region. 
With the defeat of the Serb and other Balkan forces including the Albanians, 
by the Ottomans at the battle of Kosovo/a in 1389, the long Ottoman control 
over the Balkans started. Competing with the Ottoman Empire for the domination 
of the Balkans, Russia has been on the side of Serbia in its struggle against the 
Ottomans. Although, the support of Russia has been al ways in fa v or of Serbia 
it remained ambiguous and not all the time consistent. The center of Russian 
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influence in the Balkans have moved from Montenegro in the beginning of 
eighteenth century (Anderson, 1966:48) to Bulgaria and Montenegro that 
f received better deals in the Conference of Constantinople and Treaty of San 
Stefano following Turkish amnesty with Russia in 1878. The Congress of 
Berlin in June 1878 recognized formally the independence of Serbia together 
with Montenegro and Rumania from the Ottoman Empire. In Anderson 's (1966: 
212) words 'Serbia gained merely a triangle of terri tory to the south-eats of 
her existing frontiers ... and her disillusionment with the territorial seulement 
and Russia support of Bulgaria against her, drave her at once into a rapprochement 
with the Habsburg Empire' . Russia's ambiguous policy in support of Serbia 
could be observed in the present times as weil and this paper would try to 
demonstrate that. 
Russians reserve a low regard towards Serbs due to their historie disobedience 
and quest for independence in their policies. Historically, 'Russia's align with 
Serbia, has been on the pursuit of the zones of influence rather than the Slavic 
solidarity' (Levitin, spring 2000: 131) and Orthodox faith unity. Serbs in retum 
continuously have followed an ambiguous but unremitting relationship with 
Russia. A relationship that skilfully was used to gain supremacy in the region 
visa-vie the neighbours while maintaining an independent stance in foreign 
policy and domestic affairs (Anderson, 1966: 48-9, 166, 186-7). This pattern 
of insubordination continued also during the Cold War and was masterly used 
by Tito, making the two superpowers to play out each other and receive favours 
from both sides on favour of country's prosperity. However, at the end of the 
twentieth century, although not for the first time, Russia found itself 'compelled' 
to defend the Serbian cause pushed forward by 'geopolitics imperatives rather 
th en ethnie considerations' (Danopoulos and Co bani, 1997: 187) or pan-
Orthodoxy affùiation. 
On the other hand, Turkey as the successor of the Ottoman Empire perceives 
'Kosovo/a .. . as a debt it owe toits own history' (Ecevit, 06 April1999) and 
the Balkans as an 'inseparable part ofhistory, and6 culture' (Çevikoz, 1998: 181), 
co un ting for this on a1most five centuries of coexistence un der the roof of the 
Ottoman Empire. Under the Ottoman Empire the land populated by ethnie 
Albanians, including Kosovo/a, was divided into severa! Ottoman administrative 
units. In the period of 1881-1912, which constitutes the last period before the 
establishment of the frrst independent Albanian state, the ethnie Albanians were 
split into the vilayets of Kosovo, Shkodra, Monastir, Joannina, including within 
them other ethnie groups as Vlachs, Gypsies and Turks. In Malkom' 
6 The words in italie are added. 
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(1998: 1-30) terms, the Ottomans preferred this administrative approach of 
dividing ethnie groups into different and mixed administrative units as a way 
of reducing any risk of national state-formation within the Empire. These 
inherited patterns of division remain still present in the Balkans although this 
time not because of the Ottoman Empire. Most of the Al banians converted to 
Islam and as such had a quick integration into the Ottoman Empire structures 
and society where they were accepted without discrimination. Accordingly, 
there are millions of people who have Albanian ancestry and relatives in that 
region. In addition to these realities there is a Thrkish minority living thorough 
the Balkans and in Kosovo/a in particular, left behind since the times of the 
Empire, to whose fate Thrkey is sensitive and for political and social reasons 
would like to strengthen its impact and importance on the domestic affairs of 
their constituent state. 
During the Balkan wars 1912-1913 the Ottoman Empire was driven almost 
completely from the Balkans. Serbia won the war against Bulgaria and expanded 
its territory to the east including ali of present day Macedonia and Kosova 
(Skendi 1967: 36-39). Historically the seat of the medieval Serb kingdom, 
Kosovo/a was only "liberated" from Thrkish rule by the Serb Arrny in 1912, 
where Albanians, predominantly Muslim, were the majority population (Malkom, 
1998). During the Cold War period the past rivalries were frizzed in the 
traditional terms while reflected in the framework of the 'zones of influences'. 
In the Balkans ironically history keeps unconsciously repeating and revealing 
almost the same picture in different colours. In 1914, the decaying Austro-
Hungarian Empire tried to give a lesson to the small Serbia miscalculating its 
power and the consequences of such an action. Russia got on the side of Serbia, 
Thrks sided Germany and the whole world was dragged into one of the most 
shattering wars, World War I. This war wrecked Europe for two generations, 
dissolved Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman Empires with much else. 
There is almost the same today but Europe coping in time with Kosovo/a 
conflict saved itself may be from World War III and other undesirable 
consequnces. 
3. Kosovo/a Conflict and Its Symbolics 
7 
In its symbolics, Kosovo/a question was different from Bosnia. The difference 
Civil war could be defined as a ' protracted internai violence aimed at securing control of the political and legal 
appararus of astate' (Evans and Newnham, 1998: 64). Civil wars could be separatist movements,which associa te 
with ethnie nationalism aiming at the establishment of a state ethnically homo genou s. This is the other extreme 
of civil war !hat transcend domestic political implications. 
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results form the fact that Kososvo/a did not represent a simple turmoil or a 
civil war7 within the domestic arena of the state. The case is defined as an intra 
f state conflict aiming at dividing the state in ethnie lines. The distinction between 
inter-state conflicts and intra-state conflicts is becoming less distinct today 
considering that such distinction depends from which point of view you are 
looking at the conflict. Consequently, wording Aron (1981:7) 'if a province, 
an integrated portion of the state's territory or a fraction of the population, 
refuses to submit to the centralized power and undertake an armed struggle, 
the conflict, though civil war will regard to international war, will be considered 
a foreign war by those who see the rebels as the expression of an existing or 
nascent nation'. In the Kosovo case the development of the events where 
according to the UNCHR data, 850 000 people were expulsed from their homes 
and killings in mass were continuing systematically, state centric concept of 
authority and related practices and strategies revealed to be detrirnental in the 
sense of sacrificing other human values for those of sovereignty and territorial 
inviolability of the state8. State desisted to be the protector of its citizens instead 
it twisted into a security threat to them (Moller, 2000). Under such symbolic 
the case represents the reality of separatism and the danger of granting to a 
national rninority mechanisms for secession and independence with implications 
for state sovereignty and institutions. 
Both Russia and Thrkey are sensitive to their own territorial integrity being 
subject of irredentist movements that challenge their recognized sovereignty 
integrity or national social cohesion. The issue of human rights upon which 
the Kosovo case was processed fuels other sensibilities. In Bilgin (200 1: 19) 
words 'human rights is viewed by sorne as a "national security" issue as far 
as it is perceived to be used by extemal actors to intervene .. .in domestic 
affairs'. Kosovo/a case symbolised Chechnia for Russia and Kurdish question 
for Turkey. For both countries such question represents an issue within the 
domain of state autonomy. In such a case the use of force is within the state's 
rights and both states have showed that force is on the state right to discipline 
the troublemaking peoples. There are fears that Kosovo/a case may became a 
precedent for bypassing the UN which may one day be used against states in 
sirnilar circumstances or others. In the case of Russia and Turkey, qui te easily 
following the same logic used in the Kosovo/a case the Caucasus or southeast 
Turkey issues, could be the following up of such precedent. 
8 State in Loke's understanding is the best arrangement that offered to its subjects protection from foreign 
harassments and from each other. The relationship between the state and its subjects took the forrn of a social 
contract that assigned duties and responsibilities that in the extemal environment paramount with the 'national 
interest' concept. ln the domestic realm state emerged as a protector of its subject's interests. 
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Assigning the same similarities of Kosovo/a case to Chechnia and Kurdish 
issue is not accurate. The understanding of the Kosovo/a case should be 
considered in association with its peculiarities that relate to its historical context, 
Yugoslav Federation realities and the processing and management of the who le 
conflict on the side of international community9. Consequently Russia and 
Turkey policies towards the Kosovo/a case that would be identified in the 
following section are not comprehensively justified. 
4. Post-Cold Order: Russia and Thrkey Policies on Quest of Identity. 
4.1. Russia quest for place and identity in the Post Cold Era: Dealing with 
Kosovo/a case. 
The end of the Cold War left Russia with erosion of power, shrunken in size 
and influence, stroked by financial crisis and economie difficulties. In its quests 
for place and identity Russia's foreign policy revealed ambiguity, confusion 
and inertia. Moscow's policy towards Kosovo/a failed to accomplish any of 
its proclaimed or hidden aims. Moscow managed neither to become a genuine 
partner to the West, nor to create an effective anti-Western outpost in Yugoslavia' 
(Levi tin, Spring 2000: 130). Russia found itself sandwiched between inherited 
Tsarist and Soviet ideas10, new concepts of national security interests and 
economie and military imperatives. 
For Russia, the period after the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union 
was characterised by a period of rapprochement with the West materialised in 
NATO-Russia special relations and in Russia 's participation in the Contact 
Group that dealt with peace process in Bosnia. Russian forces were part of 
IFOR and in SFOR serving side-by-side NATO forces. The same spirit per 
inertia followed in the beginning of the Kosovo/a crisis. Close consultations 
took place on the issue between Russia and Euro-Atlantic foreign ministries. 
Russia co-sponsored with the other Security Council members (China abstained) 
the UN Security Council resolution 1160 and 1199 that imposed embargo-on 
Yugoslavia and called for cease-fire and appealed on the possibility of further 
actions that would restore peace and stability in the region respectively. In the 
framework of the Contact Group, Russia dealt with the Kosovo issue before 
9 For more analytical arguments see Enver Hasani (200 1 ). 
10 In Tsarist Russia and la ter Soviet Union, expansionist policies were considered as imperatives of botb state 
security and power maximisation. 
ENIKAABAZI 223 
and during the Rambouillet negotiations 11 . The second round was held from 
15 to 18 March and finalised with one side signature of Proposed Peace 
Agreement. Only the Kosovo/a representatives signed the Agreement. The 
Agreement bad five main points: immediate cessation of violence; the withdrawal 
of FRY military, policy and paramilitary forces from Kosovo/a; the stationing 
in Kosovo/a of an international military force led by NATO; the safe return 
of all civilians and displaced peoples; an poli ti cal solution for the autonomy 
of Kosovo/a .. The cooperation with the Russians appeared to be rather good. 
In appearance a peaceful identity transition was taking place, Russia was trying 
to develop a genuine partriership with the West, meanwhile trying to safeguard 
diplomatically its superpower status. 
Convinced that a close relationship with Miliosevic was essential to Russian 
policy in the Balkans, special relationship took place between Russian military-
intelligence establishment and Belgrade regime. The ex change of visits between 
Moscow and Belgrade high officiais became more frequent, including the visit 
of Miliosevic to Moscow and his meeting with Jeltsin in June 1998 (Reuters, 
21 June 1998). For the West this was the continuation of the job division settled 
at Dayton where Russia dealt with Serbs and the West with the rest. Stretching 
to its long-established historical Russian politics, Moscow tried to oppose 
Western policies towards Miliosevic regime, smarting in the role of former 
superpower and ethnically bound to its Slav kinship. At first, it tried to boast 
its influence through a Pan-Slavic union supporting Seselj's12 call on other 
'brotherly' countries, including Armenia, Greece, Cyprus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Romania and Bulgaria, to join in a new alliance to 'counterbalance the forces 
of NATO and the European Union.' It may sound a little bit funny, but reportedly 
nobody laughed at it in Moscow (Reuters News Service, 06 November 1998). 
The Russian Duma authorised its Committee on Legislation, Judicial and Legal 
Reform and its Committee on International Affairs to draw up a draft decision 
calling on President Boris Yeltsin to sign a treaty establishing the Russia-
Belarus-Yugoslavia union. The president supported the idea of such a union 
but he never signed the decree, revealing once more incessant contradictions 
between Duma and Kremlin that partially explain Russia's puzzled foreign 
policy towards Kosovo/a crisis. At the end the issue was shelved. 
·------· ------·----------··---- ------·---- -----· --
Il First round of Rambouillet negotiations was held from 6-23 February 1999 
12 Vojuslav Seselj was deputy Prime Minister of the Yugoslav government and leader of the Serbian Radical 
Party during Milosevic time. 
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Being aware that their bid for influence in the Balkans remained fragile, 
Russia came up with a strategy that would compound NATO's difficulties by 
trying to line up a new arms contract with Cyprus. The Russians supplied S-
300 anti-aircraft missiles to Cyprus and promised to supply the SA-15 short-
range mobile air defence system as well. This decision fomented tensions 
between Greeks and Thrks and suddenly Russians became an essential player 
in the Greek-Thrkish dispute, a first step that aimed to checkmate NATO in 
the area but also shake the alliance by the Cyprus arms deal. Exploiting the 
differences between NATO members Greece and Thrkey, Russia aimed the 
preservation of the status quo in Yugoslavia and thereby preventing NATO 
from doing what it wishes without Moscow's approval. In the case of Kosovo/a, 
the tactic worked at least during 1998 (Jane's Information Group Limited,19 
October 1998). Under the American and the EU pressure upon the bellicosity 
between Greeks and Thrks as the Kosovo/a crisis worsened, the Greeks called 
off the plan to put Russian missiles on Cyprus. Once more, Russia miscalculated 
its position and abilities to yell a result in its favour and its favourite Miliosevic. 
At the same time a bitter lesson was learned; Russia did not have a real veto 
on Western actions. 
NATO's air campaign in Kosovo/a, made Russia find itself pressured on its 
western military flank through ongoing NATO advancement towards the East. 
The air strikes have come just da ys after Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic 
became officially NATO's member. Russia perceived them as an offensive 
action just after the recruitment of Russia's former allies. This situation was 
considered as a serious threat to Russia's own security since historically power 
and security were enhanced by expansionist policies that seized up nearby 
lands. Consequently, 'Moscow's fears of being encircled and isolated were 
fuelled to the level of near-hysteria' (Kremp, 22 December 1999). Boris Jeltsin, 
Russian president of that time denounced the act as a 'naked aggression' and 
warned that Russia reserved the right to take 'adequate measures, including 
military ones, to defend ... the overall security of Europe' (Niall, 26 March 
1999). Yevgeny Primakov's13. Washington visit was dramatically cancelled 
when he was halfway across the Atlantic. Ail cooperation with NATO was 
suspended and Russia's military and diplomatie representatives were recalled 
from NATO headquarters (ITAR-TASS-World Service, 23 March 1999) and 
Duma decided to abandon the ratification of the Star rn arms reduction treaty 
(Daily Telegraph, 03 April1999). On 9 April1999, Jeltsin warned that NATO 
13 Yevgeny Primakov was Russia Prime Minister of that tirne 
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actions were triggering Russia towards a military response that at minimum 
will involve Europe and may be the world as well (Reuters World Service, 9 
' April 1999). 
Multitudes of warning and empty threats were thrown out, aiming at the 
re vi val of the ghosts of the Cold War while a Russian co un ter military operation 
was feared, especially after an uncommented news which claimed that President 
Boris Jeltsin bas ordered the targeting of Russian strategie missiles at NATO 
nations (Turkish Daily News, 10 April 2001). In an effort that would make 
intentions speak out and meanwhile recovering Serbs morale, Russia announced 
its plans to move from its military base in the Black Sea nine warships to 
Adriatic Sea in a reconnaissance and monitoring mission (Reuters News Service, 
14 April1999). Russia tried to create an environment comparable with those 
of 1949 Berlin blockade or the 1961 Cuban missile crisis. However much 
suggested that the motivations behind the Russian reactions were also related 
with domestic politics, the consequent need to identify an external enemy as 
a way to express both the disagreement about NATO enlargement policies and 
the applicability of the Article 5 of the Washington treaty on out -of aria operations 
without UN Security Council approval (Antonenko, Winter 1999/2000: 124). 
At the end Russia seemed intirnidated by the prospect of damaging its 'good 
relations' with the West and consequently risking possible financial aid by the 
IMF. Despite the genuine sense of popular outrage, however, while condemning 
NATO's air strikes as a 'blow against common sense ', Yevgeny Primakov, 
Russian Prime Minister, declared that Russia would not retreat from reforms 
nor turn its back on the West. 'There will be no isolationism', he said (Financial 
Times, 26 March 1999). Russia bad more at stake than Serbia did in maintaining 
good relations with the West. 
Having lost the bit on the Balkans at least on the use of force, Russia 
prompted as an indispensable asset in peace-making efforts. Victor Chemomyrdin, 
Jeltsin's special envoy, a 'sensible politician' competent in Kosovo/a affairs 
was sent to Belgrade to lower the tensions in the region (ITAR-TASS, 20 April 
1999). With the intermediation of the Russian envoy a military-technical 
agreement was finalised, leading to the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces from 
Kosovo/a and the establishment in Kosovo/a of the peace implementation 
mission, KFOR. Obviously, Russian emissaries told Milosevic that the deal he 
was offered was the best he could get. Russia would back him no further. 
Chernomyrdin, whom the US bad deliberately briefed about its ground invasion 
12~.a~~-'-~-~~--t!U.s P.u_~~i.~I.y_.<qu_~d_ia!l, __ 0~--~~12!~-~~~r ~229)-_____________ _ 
13 Y ev geny Primakov was Russia Prime Minis ter of th at ti me 
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Bringing Russia as a partner into the peace-making coalition was a credit 
payed to Russia, frrst to put more pressure on Milosevic and second to bring 
Russia into the peace deal. Russia still remains a nuclear power with 1.2 million 
men under arms and four naval fleets that can not be ignored for long. Conscious 
of this reality Russia still acts the part of superpower and still somehow expects 
to be treated as such. In the case of Kosovo/a, Russia smarted with a combination 
of rhetorical and improbable threats, offers of help or opposition to any move 
of the West until the last deal striving to rebuild Russian influence in the world. 
The outcome of these actions revealed that 'Russia's influence and prestige-
among former Yugoslav republics and neighbouring countries, and even in 
Belgrade-bas fallen to the lowest point ever (Levitin, Spring 2000, p.130). In 
Pushkov (2000:5) terms Russia had no other options but to develop in conditions 
of the dilemrna defined by two Russia imperatives: consistent upholding of the 
country's national interests and integration into the world economy, which 
could be translated as the dilemma between maintaining and improving the 
relations with the West in favour of recognising the priority of the US and other 
Western countries interests over its own, or sacrifice its improved relations 
with the West to asserting itself as the main military-political force of the 
continent. Neither option apparently was affordable by Russia. 
Knocked down in the deferrees Russia burst out its new rnilitary doctrine14• 
The final version as approved by President Vladimir Putin on 21 April 2000 
was published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22 April2000. An unofficial translation 
in English was released by BBC Monitoring on 22 April2000. The new military 
doctrine attempts ' to counteract the strengthening of Russia as an influential 
centre of the multipolar world' and rnitigate the threats to its military security. 
The new doctrine allows Russia to use armed forces, not for the protection of 
its own territory or peace-making operation abroad but for protection of some-
other foreign-policy interests. The doctrinal provisions are supposed to have 
a deterrent effect. This includes Russia's right to use nuclear weapons in the 
event of a large-scale aggression. Russia may resort to them for lack of other 
means to ensure its national security. The internai threats are described thoroughly 
and the !essons of Chechnia enlightened by the Kosovo/a cases are obviously 
taken into account. Russia considers the internai threats as of great importance 
for Russia's security, considering that under sorne circumstances they can easily 
turn into external threats, and the Istanbul summit of the OSCE approach 
towards Russian policy in Chechnia taught this lesson. (Kunadze, June 2000). 
-------------- --------
14 A draft of the New Military Doctrine was published first by Krasnaya Zvezda on 9 October 1999, pp. 3-4 
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Domestic poli tics in Russia have been sliding gently down a historical slope 
that leads from democracy via oligarchy back to despotism, where Russian 
nationalism is the grease determining the speed of the descent and Kosovo/a 
case accelerated that speed (Ferguson, 26 March 1999). With Yeltsin resignation 
from presidency on 31 December 1999 and handover to Prime Minister Putin 
until the presidential elections in March 2000, Kosovo/a was used as an argument 
on the support of the nationalistic policies. Volunteers that were recruited for 
Yugoslavia in many cases were used as paranùlitary, to create confusions during 
the pre-electoral campaign or for propaganda effects. NATO's military action 
gave to the Russian military and politicalleaderslùp the pretext to use nationalism 
as a force for political mobilisation. The nationalistic vote was there to be won 
or lost and Putin won it. Russia is appealing on nationalism, looking at it as a 
saving boat that will help Russia to gain its internai cohesion and reconstitute 
its great power status and identity. 
4.2 Turkey quest for place and identity in the Post Cold Era and the Kosovo/a 
case 
In the Balkans Turkey's Post Cold War foreign policy remained in an 
'observer status" rather than assuming leadership. This attitude could be mainly 
attributed to the patterns of Turkish' Post Cold War security culture th at in 
Karaosmanoglu's (2000) terms could be characterized as "defensive realpolitic" 
aiming at the preservation of balance of power and status quo. Although in the 
early '90s under Turgut Ozal, Turkey started a "Balkan offensive", reviving the 
Ottoman heritage in the ex-territories of the Ottoman Empire, these policies 
were discontinued because of the war in Bosnia and Kosovo/a. 
Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans suffers the consequences of a twisted 
legacy, where the past effects the present as much as the future. The Ottoman 
past ties Turkey to the Balkans, while the challenges of the future keep it in 
the role of the follower unable to embark on independent actions. In Ismail 
Cem's (September-November 1997:7-6) words 'Turkey is now facing the task 
of rethinking its own universal purpose. It has to draw on the past, dream about 
the future and determine what original contribution it can bring to the grand 
walk of humanity. The goal of today's generation should be to carry Turkey 
to the 21 st century with the characteristics of a "Global State'". 
Turkey's policy towards Kosovo/a moved through concession and passive 
stances in general, favouring the preservation of the status quo to offering 
----------- -~ --'--
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an active support for NATO military operations. Laying behind the incontestable 
princip les of the UN charter and the OSCE documents, Turkey was flrm about 
the preservation of the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and sympathised with 
the calls for refrain from the use of force and interference into the internai 
affairs (Turkish Daily News, 1 May 1998). Negotiations and dialogue without 
preconditions between the Belgrade regime and the Kosovo/a leadership under 
the United States mediating role were considered the way out of the Kosovo/a 
crisis. (Ergil, 29 March 1998). The Turkish approach was very closed to that 
of the Belgrade government (Tanascovic, 01 April 1999) excluding Turkish 
request for the US as mediator. Accordingly Turkey remained ambiguous about 
the outcomes, the effectiveness and the legitimacy of NATO operations in 
Yugoslavia. Many leading Turkish scholars formulated their concerns about 
NATO's actions. In Seyfi Tashan's, words (l.April.l999) the head of Dl§ 
Politika Enstitüsü (Institute of Foreign Policy) in Ankara, NATO's operation 
' aggravated the massacres of Kosovars by Serbs'. Reluctant on air strikes 
efficiency, Hasan Koni (l.April.1999) professorat Ankara University and 
ASAM (Centre for Eurasian Strategie Studies Research) referring to the case 
of Iran would word out that 'it has become obvious that air strikes cannat 
produce immediate results'. Huseyin Bagc1 (l.April.1999) professorat Middle 
East Technical University in Ankara, would be concerned about the fact that 
'NATO's intervention was not approved by the U.N. Security Council', and as 
such the attitude of Russia and the sending of its warships to the Mediterranean 
could find a justification on that. The position of the Government was not th at 
distant from such approaches as weil (Radikal, 08 July 1998). Obviously Turkey 
was sketching parallels between the Kosovo/a case and the Kurdish question 
in South-eastern Turkey, fearing a polarisation process in ethnie lines. 
Other insecurities that were related to the case of Kosovo/a were present 
forTurkey as weil. In Ecevit (27 March 1999), terms 'Serbian-Orthodox union, 
the foreign policy based on the Serb-Orthodox axis' was considered as a driving 
force towards a polarisation that 'might be far more dangerous than that of the 
ideological polarisation' for Turkey. Turkey's frustration grew up after the 
outcome of the NATO's operations and the future of Kosovo/a. The future 
prospects of Kosovo/a were perceived as the start of a dangerous process. 
(Utku, 20 June 1999). The crisis in Kosovo/a opened the Albanian question in 
the Balkans that is not only related with the establishment of an Albanian state 
of ali Albanians leaving in the Balkans but with the re-drowning of the geopolitics 
of the Balkans. The Balkan wars 1912-1913 ended up by splitting theAlbanian 
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inhabited lands into two parts: one half of the population in the new created 
Albanian state and the other half remained split among the neighbours. Being 
split into different states since the creation of the Albanian state in 1912, 
Albanian factor has never constituted an important voice into the Balkan 
policies. Demographically ethnie Albanians constitute a potential, which easily 
could, in a case of unification, change the geopolitical configuration of the 
region (Abazi, 2001). On the other handAlbanians are mostly ofMuslim faith 15• 
Religious belonging is used for poli ti cal mobilisation in the region and beyond. 
Numbers and religion belonging decided the alignments in the region and 
beyond, Greece, Serbia and Russia aligning together in 'defence' of pan-
Orthodoxy. Turkey being aware of such configuration would like to emerge 
in the Balkans as a counter-balancing factor. First it is in Thrkey's geo-strategic 
interests to avoid an overwhelming Pan-orthodox axe in the Balkans, based on 
Greek-Serb orthodox kinship that would eut Thrkey out from Europe and will 
bring Russia in. Moreover, there is a belief in the Thrkish circles that in the 
Balkans 'Thrkey is at least as important a Eurasian power as Russia is. The 
aim is to prevent Russia from becoming even stronger in the region. This is 
what the Serbians are trying to accomplish in Kosovo/a' (Thrkish Daily News, 
1 September 1998). On quest for elues in the region Defence Minister Hikmet 
Sami Turk at the same time announced that Thrkey's policy in the region would 
secure 'autonomy for the ethnie Thrkish minority in Kosovo/a within the borders 
of the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia' (Thrkish Daily News, 25 March 1999). 
Turkish minority in Kosovo/a and Yugoslavia is at the minimal margins of 
significance. Nevertheless, this policy has double effects. First Thrkey keeps 
its presence in the region, second, the status quo and the existing balance of 
power in the region is preserved. This policy is not any different from today 
Turkish political security culture of status quo preservation. 
Affected by the concems about the domestic cohesion, economie imperatives 
and its Post Cold War identity, Thrkey's foreign policy remains often subordinated 
or held hostage of domestic policies. More than the case itself Turkey is 
preoccupied about the pressure that is exercised on Thrkey over the issue of 
minority rights and the parallels that are drawn between the case of Kosovo/a 
and Kurdish issue. Ocalan's capture and trial and the crisis in Kosovo/a took 
place during the electoral campaign for the election of Thrkish parliament. 
-·-- -·--------------·---------------- ----------- ---
15 Mi1osevic used religious belonging as propaganda to gain support against the Albanians. Kosovars were 
considered as Is1amist terrorists and their aim was the creation of a Great Albaina a bastion of Islamic 
fundamentalist in Europe. In history Albanians has never been guided by religion. The only unifying factor of 
the Albanians as declared in the League of Prisren ( 1878) is the Albanianship (Feja e Shqiptarit eshte Shqiptaria 
The Albanian faith is the Albanianship) {Skendi, 1967). Furtherrnore, Kosovars did not receive any help from 
the Islamic world that this time led by Saddam Huseyn who was on the side of Milosevic. 
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Turkey finds it difficult to persuade other nations that the 15 or so million 
Turkish Kurds officially have the same rights as any Turkish citizen. There is 
the belief among the Western countries that in reality Kurds are still treated as 
second class citizens and there are many allegations of hu man rights violations 
(Contemporary Review 1 April 2000). Accordingly the EU has placed Turkey 
last among the countries in the accession process, mainly due to an unacceptable 
human rights record, together with the problem of Cyprus. 
Turkey sees with distrust its membership delay in the EU though it is a part 
of Europe via its membership in NATO. Under such considerations in quest 
to accentuate Turkey's Western vocation, Turkey felt obliged to share NATO's 
aspirations and participated willingly and actively to the American-led warin 
Kosovo/a. On the other hand strengthening Western belonging is an important 
feature not only of Turkey's quest for identity but part of its security policy 
and culture (Karaosmanoglu, 2000) as weiL Accordingly, Turkey joined NATO's 
naval forces in the Adriatic Sea with a frigate and the Turkish bases were 
offered to NATO for facilitating the military operations, while declaring that 
military action should remain the last option for Kosovo/a (Turkish Daily News, 
23 January 1999). When NATO took the decision to intervene Turkey expressed 
its readiness to participate in the air strike and if necessary in land operation 
as well (Turkish Daily News, 25 March 1999). There were sorne practical 
reasons after such a zeal. The Russian strategy behind Cyprus missile crises 
was considered as an effort that aimed to squeeze Turkey as hard as possible 
while improving relations with Greece. In such a case Turkey needed NATO 
as an strategie counterbalancing partner. On the other hand, Turkey's apparent 
exclusion from the ongoing diplomatie efforts on the problem, raised not only 
the question of the role ofTurkey in Kosovo/a but also the frustration ofTurkey 
about its place and role in the European and regional security architectures 
especially after the last developments on the European Security and Defence 
ldentity (ESDI) issues. 
With the end of the Cold War, Turkey an important Euro-Transatlantic 
geo-strategic partner felt marginalised with the disappearance of the Rus sian 
threat in the south-eastern flank of NATO. Turkey seems to be left out of 
political and security processes in Europe and Kosovo/a. Turkey did have no 
influence in the Rambuillet negations or the Paris talks. Russia or Finland 
were mediating between NATO and Belgrade while Turkey was put aside. 
Not much is left for Turkey to do. Turkey is neither member of the UN 
Security Council or of the Contact Group and the G8- important forums with 
a decision-making authority. The frustration of Turkey over these issues that 
• 
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are particularly related with its identity definition is growing high (Utku, 20 
June 1999). Facing these Post Cold War insecurities Turkey intensified its 
pressures for membership in the European security architecture . 
For the EU the end of the 1990s and 'the events in Kosovo/a, the new 
geopolitics situation stemming from the end of the Cold War, the need to build 
a political union commensurate with the Union 's increasing weight in international 
affairs have made possible to get this perspective of a strong autonomous 
Europe, capable of asserting its interests while respecting its alliances, on the 
road again' (Fontaine, 2000: 31). Following up a series of previous meetings 
and decisions of the EU on common security and defence policies at Cologne 
in June 1999, the EU decided to take over the crisis management role of the 
WEU while a subsequent meeting at Helsinki called for the establishment by 
2003 of a 60 000 strong force drawn from the EU states that could be deployed 
for a year within 60 days and a military planing staff and political body to 
direct it. The European Rapid Reaction Force announced in Brussels on 
November 20, 2000 followed directly from the Cologne and Helsinki decisions. 
The EU decision to enhance its military independent actions while having 
"separable but not separate" capabilities with NATO presents challenges to 
Turkey's security policies and identity in the Post Cold War Era since it used 
to be an indispensable and inseparable participant in the Euro-Atlantic affairs. 
Refuging under the Kemailst legacies that historically were designed to 
strengthen the country's internai cohesion, Turkey withholds from becoming 
a dominant power in the Balkans. lts perspective on the Balkans does not go 
beyond a close cooperation between Balkan countries and the preservation of 
the regional balances (Cern, September-November 1997:7). This is considered 
a realistic policy while reflecting the interests of present-day Turkey (Turkish 
Daily News, 27 January 1999). In Koni (l.April.1999) understanding Turkey's 
strategie vision towards the region remains defined in economie terms since 
'conducting of military functions in the region is not possible due to the well-
known attitudes of Greece and other Christian nations in the region towards 
Turkey'. The economie imperatives explain partially the stand by position of 
Turkey in the case of Kosovo/a that in many cases was considered as favourable 
to Milosevic. The main commercial partner of Turkey is the EU with almost 
50 percent of export in this direction, not ignoring the imports. The Balkans 
is the shortest roadway, while Serbia corridor is the most feasible . 
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Nevertheless, the political opinion showed mixed feelings about what was 
happening in the Balkans, going sometime beyond the economie and political 
imperatives. In the Grand Unity Party (BBP) Chairman Muhsin Yazicioglu 
terms, 'the basic aim of the aggressors in the Balkans .... is to force a reckoning 
with Thrkey', Yazicioglu pointed out that the Serbian domination of Kosovo/a 
was nothing short of occupation, since one country had occupied another 
country's land. In Yaztcwglu terms ' international organisations have to side 
with Kosovo/a in order to elirninate this un just occupation'. Turkey wasn't yet 
aware of this reality and once more it lost the opportunity to increase its 
influence in the Balkans. 'Turkey must understand this, and the Turkish Republic 
must make peace with history' (Turkish Daily News, 1 September 1998)- he 
said. An attitude that revealed the perplexity ofTurkish politics faced with the 
quest for a role and identity in International politics after the end of the Cold 
War. 
Conclusions 
Kosovo/a crisis revealed Russian domestic weaknesses and sensed the lost 
of its superpower status. Russia's nuclear arsenal have lost its politicalleverage 
after the Cold War Era. Economie collapse and social developments in the 90s 
impeded Russia to take the role of a world po licy shaper. Turkey moved forward 
living the dilemma of pacifying domestic imperatives with international needs. 
In a counterbalancing act Turkey smarted again as a valuable ally of NATO, 
not necessary of the EU, especially for the US policies in the Turkey's near 
abroad were both countries policies converge. 
Russia and Turkey, while co ming from different points of interest revealed 
a low common denominator in their policies towards Kosovo/a crisis. Both 
countries aimed the preservation of the status quo in the region, which implicitly 
or explicitly favoured Milosevic for a while. While Russian policies towards 
the Kosovo/a crisis kept Milosevic for a long time defiant towards International 
Cornmunity pressure to stop its 'final solution' policies, Turkey tried to keep 
a modifiable position that ended with its stance against Milosevic while 
favouring the preservation of Yugoslavia territoriality and integrity. 
It must be emphasised that Milosevic was able to play intelligibly the card 
of separatism and irredentism to bring these two important countries with 
• 
• 
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influence in the region in his favour. What Milosevic miscalculated was the 
overstress he gave to these factors in shaping both Russia and Thrkey foreign 
policies. The aftermath crisis brought Turkey and Russia on the side of NATO. 
In the case ofTurkey's both the geo-strategic and economie needs and the quest 
for regional balance favoured its inclination towards Western affiliation. For 
Russia economie and social imperatives and the growing disparities on nuclear 
and conventional forces with NATO pushed back Russia from its pro-Milosevic 
policies (Arbatov, 1999, 198). 
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